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OMNIBUS INSURANCE Rights of an Injured Named Insured
Against the Permissive Driver
By RIcHAD L.

BOWERS*

A

BUYS a new car, obtaining complete insurance coverage thereon
from All Sure Insurance Company. In this new auto, and with his
friend B he takes a pleasure trip during which B, while driving the auto
misses a curve and drives into a ditch, injuring A.
A thereupon brings suit against B for his negligence and claims
that the liability insurance carried by himself covers B under an omnibus clause so that All Sure must come to B's defense and be obligated
to A if he recovers a judgment against B.
This is a hypothetical case but very close to reality. Can an owner
sue a permissive driver of his auto to collect for injuries sustained to
himself due to the driver's negligence? Just what is an omnibus clause
and how do courts construe such clauses?
Omnibus Clause
Independent of general insuring clauses in an auto liability policy,
there oftentimes appears, either within the policy or by way of indorsement or rider, a clause purporting to extend the protection of the policy
to any person or persons coming within a defined group. This is the
omnibus clause.'
By this clause, the insurer agrees to indemnify not only the named
policyholder but also any licensed driver or person riding in or operating the owner-insured's auto with the owner-insured's permission.2 This
clause obligates the insurance company to pay any legally binding obligation rendered against such person covered by the policy.
Interpretation
While there are not an abundant number of cases, there appears
to be some conffict on the question whether the coverage of an auto
liability policy includes the death of or an injury to, one who either
is expressly named as an insured as the owner of the policy or one who
is protected as an additional insured under an omnibus clause. 3
It seems the differences in the conclusions and decisions of the
courts may be explained because of the variations in the provisions of
a particular policy under consideration.
Member, Second
15 AM. JuR. Auto
2 5 Amr. JuR. Auto
3 143 A.L.R. 1394

Year class.
§ 532 (1944).
§§ 533-34 (1944).
(1943).
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In MacBey v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,4 plaintiff, owner of a
vehicle covered by an insurance policy, was injured while riding in her
own auto driven by another with her permission. Plaintiff sued the
driver and after receiving a judgment against him proceeded against
the defendant on the policy contending that she, the plaintiff, would
be entitled to recover under the omnibus clause of the policy. The policy contained an omnibus clause insuring others who were riding or
operating the insured's vehicle with the insured's permission.
A Massachusetts statute concerning the liability of insurers to policyholders stated that the insurer should provide: ".... indemnity for
or protection to the insured, and any person responsible for the operation of the insured's motor vehicle with his express or implied consent
against loss by reason of the liability to pay damages to others for bodily
injuries." 5 [Emphasis added.]
The court in rendering a judgment against the plaintiff said that
the word "others" describing persons to whom damages were to be
paid, preceded by the words "insured" and "any person" joined as describing those to be protected by the policy, showed that the inclusion
of the owner-insured within the class of beneficiaries was not the intent
of the legislature.
The plaintiff could have no recourse to the insurance policy for any
judgment rendered against the driver. The word "others"in the policy
did not include the owner-insured.
Several cases6 since MacBey have held that the insured was not
covered by omnibus clauses. A Connecticut case 7 on facts similar to
MacBey, when confronted with the task of construing an omnibus
clause, said, "A public liability policy is not a policy of accident insurance indemnifying the insured against injuries suffered by himself in
an accident. By its definite terms it assured against claims for damages
for which the insured or others named in the policy might become
liable." 8
It seems that most of the cases concerning the right of the ownerinsured to sue the permissive driver and have recourse on his own
liability policy hinge on the construction of a few words in the omnibus
clause. The word "others," has barred recovery in MacBey and its supporting cases. These cases have been cited a number of times and still
seem to be the authority in their jurisdictions.9
&292 Mass. 105, 197 N.E. 516 (1935).
53 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, 34A.
6Cain v. American Policyholders Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 645, 183 Atl. 403 (1936);
Oliveria v. Preferred ASC Ins. Co. of New York, 312 Mass. 426, 45 N.E.2d 263 (1942).
7 Cain v. American Policyholders Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 645, 183 At. 403 (1936).
8Id.at 653, 183 At. at 407.
o Clark v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 148 Conn. 15, 166 A.2d 713 (1960); Joyce
v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America, 312 Mass. 354, 44 N.E.2d 776 (1942).
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There are, however, jurisdictions not in accord with the principles
of MacBey. In Hardtner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,' 0 the court undertook the problem of construing an omnibus clause containing the word
"others" as in MacBey.
The court in rendering a judgment for the administrator of the
owner-insured said that the intention of the contracting parties to the
policy should govern, but to say the word "others" does not include
the owner-insured is a strained construction of the policy. The word
"others" is ambiguous and subject to more than one construction, but
the court thought a reasonable construction would include persons
other than the operator of the auto driving with the consent of the
owner-insured, including the owner-insured.
This case turned on the word "others," which the court held included the owner-insured, contrary to previous cases discussed. Other
cases allowing recovery have turned on similar words such as "any person or persons." 1
2
The words, "any person," were construed in a New York case'
where the omnibus clause provided that the insurer would pay damages for bodily injuries suffered by any person arising out of the use of
an auto for which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay.
The court said the language used in an insurance policy must be
given its ordinary meaning such as the average policyholder of ordinary
intelligence, as well as the insurer, would attach to it. If an exclusion
of liability is intended which is not apparent from the language employed, it is the insurer's responsibility to make such intention clearly
known. The case held that the owner-insured was included by the
words "any person" and could recover from his insurance company for
his injuries sustained at the hands of a permissive driver.
Thus far in all cases mentioned there were no exclusion clauses
contained in the insurance policies. In the absence of statutory provisions forbidding their inclusion, clauses providing that the coverage
under an omnibus clause does not extend liability for bodily injury or
death of an insured have usually been held valid and effective to pro3
tect the insurer.1
The California Position
There is only one case in California that has squarely met the point
of construing the wording of an omnibus clause where the ownerinsured was trying to collect on his own policy.
10 189 So. 365 (La. App. 1939).
11 Howe v. Howe, 87 N.H. 338, 179 At. 362 (1935); Archer v. General Cas. Co.
of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100, 261 N.W. 9 (1935).
12 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Cas. Co. of America, 285 App. Div. 767, 140

N.Y.S.2d 670 (1955).
13Jenkins v. Morano, 74 F. Supp. 234 (1947); Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix
Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956); Musselman v. Mutual Auto Ins. Co.
of Town of Herman, 266 Wis. 387, 63 N.W.2d 691 (1954).
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In Bachman v. Independence Indem. Co.,' 4 the owner-insured requested another to drive her on a trip. While on the trip the driver
negligently drove over an embankment and killed the owner-insured.
The deceased had previously obtained a liability policy from the defendant which read in part:' 5
...

[B]y reason of its ownership, [the auto'sJ maintenance, or use...

shall cause bodily injuries by accident,... fatal or otherwise, to any
person or persons, and for which bodily injuries the insured and/or
others as herein provided are liable... then the company will insure
against loss arising out of such liability.., the named insured, and/or
any person or persons while riding in or legally operating any of the
automobiles... with the permission of the named insured.
Plaintiff, the administrator of the deceased, filed suit against the
driver for wrongful death for which judgment was given, and then
brought suit against the defendant demanding payment of the judgment.
The defendant contended that the proper test to apply is whether
the deceased would have had a right of action against the driver had
she lived. This was based on the theory that the heirs can not recover
for a death unless the deceased would have been able to recover for
an injury.
The California court held that the test contended by the defendant
need not be considered because the plaintiff had sued and recovered a
final judgment against the driver who operated the auto with the permission of the deceased.
The construction of the policy was the only concern of the court.
If the insurer desired to place limitations upon its liability to cover the
situation it had the opportunity to do so. Having prepared the policy,
any ambiguity, if one exists, must be construed against the defendant. 16
Although Bachman is squarely in point and has not up to this time
been overruled, it is an older case and can not be taken by itself as the
California position on the supposed factual situation.
Recovery by the Owner-Insured
In order for an owner-insured to sue and collect on his own policy
he must meet certain requirements:
(1) He must prove that his auto liability policy includes himself
and the permissive driver who injures him. In the absence of any law
declaring the obligation of an insurer as to permissive use of an insured
auto, the injured person is bound by any limitations contained in the
14214 Cal. 529, 6 P.2d 943 (1931).
15 Id. at 530, 6 P.2d at 943.

16 Missen v. Bolich, 177 Cal. App. 2d 145, 1 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1960).
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policy. 17 The owner-insured must prove that he has not been excluded
from recovery by the policy limitations.
(2) The owner-insured must obtain a judgment against the negligent permissive driver before he can bring in his insurance company
under an omnibus clause. The victim of an auto accident has no right
of action against the insurer of a driver until the recovery of a judgment
against the latter, in absence of any provisions in the policy that it
should inure directly to the benefit of "any injured person."1 8
Qualifying Under the Omnibus Clause
In California,'0 an owner's vehicle liability policy insures the person
named therein and any other person, as insured, using any described
motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising
out of ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle.
insurEvery liability policy issued in California must have a clause
20
ing others using the owner-insured's auto with his permission.
It is against public policy for an insurance company to limit coverage so as to exclude coverage when an auto is driven by someone other
than the insured.

21

The owner-insured's problem is establishing himself in the category
of "others" under the mandatory clause when his auto is being driven
by a permissive driver.
While California Vehicle Code section 16451 is explicit in its
terms, 22 in that every liability policy must insure the named insured
and other persons using the insured's auto with his permission, it becomes somewhat confusing when read with California Vehicle Code
section 17150,23 which makes every owner of a motor vehicle liable
for death or injury resulting from use of the owner's auto by himself
or by another with his permission.
17 Western Mach. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 488, 75 P.2d 609
(1938),
isMercer Cas. Co. v. Lewis, 41 Cal. App. 2d 918, 108 P.2d 65 (1940).
19 CAL. VEH. CODE § 16451.
20 Wildman v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957).

at 39, 307 P.2d at 364.
§ 16541: "An owner's policy of liability insurance shall: (A)

21

Id.

22

CAL. VEH. CODE

designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby intended to be granted. (B) Insure the persons
named therein and any other persons, as insured, using any described motor vehicle with
the express or implied permission of said assured; against loss from liability imposed by
law for damages arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle .. "
23 CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150: "Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the
operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner, or otherwise, by any person
using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner and
the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of such
civil damages."
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Reading the two sections together in the light of an omnibus clause
seems to be ambiguous.
How can an owner establish himself as what is referred to as
"others" under section 16451 and then in section 17150 have it be said
that the negligence of a permissive driver will be imputed to him.
The owner-insured is contending he should be allowed to recover
under an omnibus clause for negligence imputed to himself. Viewing
the situation in that aspect, an owner-insured could never contend that
as a passenger riding in his own auto he could qualify as a beneficiary
of the omnibus clause. The effect would be that the owner-insured
would be collecting from his own insurance company for his own negligence (negligence imputed to him).
Until recently a defense following this line was available. A decision handed down by the California district court of appeal wiped out
any defense set up by section 17150. The case in point is Mason v.
Russell.24 The plaintiff, owner-insured, permitted defendant to drive
his auto. Defendant negligently struck and injured the plaintiff.
The trial court held that under California Vehicle Code section
17150 an owner could not recover from a permissive driver because the
negligence of the driver was imputed to the owner.
The district court of appeal reversed the decision saying the negligence of a permissive driver of an auto is not imputed to the owner
so as to bar recovery by the owner for injuries sustained by himself
against the driver. In the Mason case the owner was not riding in the
auto but it seems by the holding, that whether he was riding in the
auto or not the same result would be reached.

Obtaining Judgment Against the Permissive Driver
secRecent California cases have made California Vehicle Code
5
tion 17158 a possible bar to recovery by the owner-insured.2
As stated previously if the owner-insured is a qualified beneficiary
under the omnibus clause of his policy he must first receive a judgment
against the driver before the insurance company becomes legally
26
liable.
California Vehicle Code section 17158 states:
No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway, without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other person,
has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of such
vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of
such driver on account of personal injuries to or the death of the guest
during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that
158 Cal. App. 2d 391, 322 P.2d 486 (1958).
2-5Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 152 Cal. App. 2d 723, 313 P.2d 88 (1957); Ray v. Hanisch,
147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (1957).
26Rupley v. Huntsman, 159 Cal. App. 2d 307, 324 P.2d 19 (1958); Spencer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 797, 313 P.2d 900 (1957).
24
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the injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful
misconduct of the driver.
Is the owner-insured a guest in his own auto while riding with a
permissive driver? It must be remembered that here we are dealing
only with ordinary negligence and not wilful misconduct or intoxication. Under the latter conditions there seems to be no question that
the owner-insured or any other person may sue the permissive driver.
By the wording of the statute it is clear that an insurance company
can not be held liable if the owner is a guest in his own car. The statute
explicitly states the driver is not liable for civil damages nor any other
person legally liable for the conduct of the driver.
Under the standard omnibus clause the insurance company obligates itself to become legally liable for a permissive user of an insured's
auto. If the owner-insured is a guest, California Vehicle Code section
17158 negates any legal liability imposed on the insurance company by
the omnibus clause
What position have the California courts taken on the question,
"Can an owner be a guest in his own auto under section 17158?"
In Ray v. Hanisch,27 plaintiff and defendant were on a pleasure
trip in the plaintiff's auto, and while defendant was driving an accident occurred. Plaintiff was injured and brought suit for personal injuries in two counts.
The first count alleged ownership of the auto and ordinary negligence. The second alleged the same facts plus an agreement by plaintiff
and defendant to share oil and gas expenses. Defendant demurred and
the trial court sustained the demurrer. Plaintiff appealed after refusing
to amend the complaint.
28
The appellate court in affirming the trial court cited various cases
and stated that the mere fact that plaintiff was riding in her own vehicle while being driven by another did not classify her as a "guest"
within Code section 17158.
By the courts admission the question raised in Ray was one of first
impression. 29 What prompted the court to make a definite statement
that an owner could not be a guest in his own car? The court discussed
cases in point from other jurisdictions ° concluding that the reasoning
of those cases was logical and unanswerable and without further discussion made its conclusion.
After making this statement the court proceeded to discuss the
counts alleged by plaintiff. The court held that the first count, which
147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (1957).
Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 Atl. 379 (1936); Lorch v.
Englin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952).
29 147 Cal. App. 2d at 746, 306 P.2d at 32.
soGledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 At. 379 (1936); Lorch v.
27

28

Englin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952).
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alleged ownership and ordinary negligence, standing alone, was sufficient for a cause of action.
If the court had stopped at this point or if the plaintiff had only
alleged ownership and negligence the case would probably have gone
to trial on the merits. However, plaintiff in a second count realleged
the facts in the first count plus an agreement by plaintiff and defendant to share oil and gas expenses.
To this count the court declared that plaintiff had not alleged sufficient compensation as defined in section 17158 and since the second
count pleaded in detail the facts of the first count and the second did
not allege adequate compensation they both were vulnerable to defendant's demurrer and the demurrer was sustained.
What has the court inferred by sustaining the demurrer? The first
count alleged a cause of action and if the case had gone to trial the defendant could have raised a defense that plaintiff was a guest and possibly this contention would have been upheld. It seems the plaintiff
anticipated this defense and tried to overcome this by pleading compensation. The court said adequate compensation had not been alleged
and thus plaintiff had pleaded herself out of court. The court has inferred that because the plaintiff had not alleged adequate compensation she was a guest.
Why did the court even discuss compensation? Before affirming
the demurrer the court said outright that an owner did not become a
guest in his own auto merely because he is being driven by another;
but then turned around and said that plaintiff had not alleged adequate
compensation and thus had no cause of action on the second count. If
the plaintiff was not a guest as stated by the court then what does it
matter that she had not stated adequate compensation? It would not
be necessary if she were not a guest. Why should compensation matter
or why should the demurrer be sustained if the plaintiff were not a
guest?
By sustaining the demurrer the court in reality held that an owner
may be a guest in his own auto if no compensation is given for the ride.
Unfortunately, the court discussed decisions of Connecticut and Pennsylvania sl holding that an owner could not be a guest in his own auto
and declared these cases sound, despite the fact that the holding of the
court was contrary to those cases.32
The California court followed Ray in AhIgren v. Ahlgren,33 saying
that an owner may not be a guest in his own auto. The court in Ahigren
stated no opinion on the question presented and only said that Ray was
the controlling case on the issue in question. No other case was cited
on the issue and the whole basis of the decision rested on Ray.
31 Id.

See also, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 93 (1958); 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 652 (1957).
33 152 Cal. App. 2d 723, 313 P.2d 88 (1957).
32
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The court in Ahigren failed to apprehend the meaning of the ambiguous language in Ray and followed the opinion without close examination. The Supreme Court of Minnesota 4 when confronted with a
problem similar to that of Ray and Ahlgren reviewed the two cases.
The court stated it did not understand the decision reached in Ahigren
in Ahigren overlooked the decision of
and that apparently the court
5
Ray on the second count.3
Since Ahigren is the latest case in point, holding that an owner
may not be a guest in his own auto, this is law in California.
Ray, being the first case in the jurisdiction to bring up the question
"Can an owner be a guest in his own auto?" it is only natural that the
court in Ahigren looked to it as authority. However, what precedent
has Ray set? The language is clear but the decision does not conform
with the rule stated, and its reasoning is ambiguous. Ahlgren is the law,
but how sound is it when based upon such ambiguous authority? Will
the next case before the court hold that Ray is so ambiguous that the
decision reached in Ahigren is not sound?
By looking at Ray it is by no means definite that an owner is not
a guest and it seems that an owner may be a guest in his own auto in
California.
Taking this interpretation, unless a permissive driver is guilty of
wilful misconduct or intoxication, or the owner-insured has given some
sort of compensation to the driver, the owner-insured has no cause of
action against the permissive driver for ordinary negligence. As concluded the owner-insured has no recourse to his insurer under an omnibus clause in his liability policy. The problem hinges upon whether
an owner-insured can be a guest in his own auto and this does not seem
to be a well defined matter at the present time.
As to the matter of compensation it is for the courts to decide. However, in Ray, the exchange of social amenities or reciprocal hospitality
such as sharing the cost of gas or oil and driving while one rests was not
sufficient compensation as is defined in California Vehicle Code section 17158.
The picture on the California horizon is not clear. For a clearer
view of the question it might be well to compare Bachman and Ray.
The fact situations in Bachman and Ray are similar. In both cases
the plaintiff had asked another to drive. In both cases the plaintiff,
owner-insured, was injured (killed in Bachman) when the driver negligently drove off the road. In neither case was wilful misconduct or
intoxication alleged. In both cases only ordinary negligence was the
alleged cause of the accident.
In Bachman the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the driver
and the owner-insured's insurance company. In Ray the owner-insured
34

Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958).

3! Id at 468, 90 N.W.2d at 541.
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was barred from recovery against the driver and thus was barred from
recovery if she had tried to place herself under the benefit of an omnibus clause in her insurance policy.
In Bachman the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the driver
for negligence. Although the case in which the plaintiff in Bachman
recovered is not recorded or cited36 it seems from the reports that
nothing was brought up concerning a guest statute of any kind. The
defendant had contended that the administrator of Bachman should
not be able to recover unless the decedent would have had an action
against the driver if she had lived.
The court's cognizance of the contention was slight in saying that
the plaintiff had sued the driver and recovered a judgment and that the
theoretical rights of the decedent were not involved.
Now, turning to Ray, the whole decision of whether the ownerinsured could have recourse to his own policy depends upon the ownerinsured's theoretical rights. In Ray the plaintiff was not killed but if
he had been killed could his administrator have sued the driver for
negligence? By Bachman he could! If the owner-insured was a guest
he could not, if he was not a guest, then a suit could be brought. The
two cases are so close they can hardly be distinguished.
Conclusions
An attorney unfamiliar with auto insurance law might be inclined
to feel that an omnibus clause is surplusage. It is conceded by most
that an auto policy is intended for the protection of the owner-insured
and persons operating with his permission from legal liability imposed
by others, and is not intended to compensate the insured for his own
injuries.
In more recent policies issued, a direct policy exception prohibits
recovery for injury or death of a named insured and where such exclu7
sion is contained in the policy, it is enforced according to its terms.3
More difficulty is present where the policy contains no such express
exceptions.
The majority of the courts have permitted the owner-insured to
recover for his own injuries. The reason for the majority rule is not
without logic. The insurer intends to protect any person operating with
the insured's permission in every case. If the insurer denies recovery
to the owner-insured then it is not affording complete protection to the
additional insured under the omnibus clause. Since most policies purport to render complete protection by the omnibus clause the rule of
38
strict construction against the company must be applied.
36 Bachman v. Independence Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 297 Pac. 110 (1927).
37 Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423,296 P.2d 801 (1956);

Canadian Indem. Co. v. Western Nat. Ins. Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 512, 286 P.2d 532
(1955).
3
8 Artukovich v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 312, 310 P.2d 461
(1957).
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acciBy applying the rule favorably to the additional insured the
39
dent is covered and the owner-insured is permitted to recover.
The decisions of the courts contend that it is the insurer's privilege
and indeed its duty to insert exclusions in their policies if they desire
to prohibit recovery in the situations where the owner-insured is injured. 40
It has been argued and upheld that the cases must be examined
from the point of view of the driver. The driver expects and demands
protection. It does not matter to him who the plaintiff is, but rather,
the matter of consequence being that he has become liable to pay a
41
judgment and needs the benefit of the insurance.
As concluded here, Bachman falls under the majority rule and is
sound law in California. Yet, in the light of Ray, Bachman takes on a
role of minor importance.
It is the rule that a judgment must be rendered against the person
alleged to be covered by the omnibus
clause in the policy before the
2
insurance company becomes liable.'

Looking at the words of the court in Ray, an owner-insured may
sue and have judgment rendered against a permissive driver. Looking
at the holding of the court and the ambiguity of the entire case, in most
instances an owner-insured injured while riding in his own
auto being
3
driven by another is a guest and can not sue the driver.4
While Ahlgren might have been the catalyst that evolved a definite
meaning from Ray it seems that the court overlooked the meaning of
the case. Ahigren has made a definite holding but only by citing Ray.
Has AhIgren really resolved the problem?
As the problem now stands, California is a jurisdiction that will
allow an owner-insured to collect on his own liability policy. This conclusion is reached by looking at Bachman, Ray, and AhIgren. But it
seems Ray is a weak link in this chain of cases. Its ambiguity gives rise
to suspicion that a forceful argument could be made against an ownerinsured who is trying to collect under the omnibus clause of his own
policy. Such argument could bar recovery against the negligent permissive driver and thus bar recovery from the owner-insured's insur-

ance company.
39 Farmer v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 11 F. Supp. 542 (1935); Bachman v.
Independence Indem. Co., 214 Cal. 529, 6 P.2d 943 (1931); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Madison, 11 Il, App. 2d 206, 136 N.E.2d 533 (1956); Hardtner v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 189 So. 365, (La. 1939); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Garland, 126
A.2d 246 (N.H. 1956); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Cas. Co. of America, 285 App.
Div. 767, 140 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1955); Archer v. General Cas. Co., 219 Wis. 100, 261
N.W. 9 (1935).
40 Bachman v. Independence Indem. Co., supra note 39.
41 APPLEMAN, 7 INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE 221 (Supp. 1961).
42 Rupley v. Huntsman, 159 Cal. App. 2d 307, 324 P.2d 19 (1958); Spencer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 797, 313 P.2d 900 (1957).
43 See also, 32 So. CAL. L. REv. 93 (1958), 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 652 (1957).

